DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 263 512 CG 018 669

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TITLE The Social Psychology of Emotions with Some Classroom Applications.
SPONS AGENCY National Inst. on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism (DHHS), Rockville, Md.
PUB DATE 15 Aug 85
GRANT MH-38014
NOTE 37p.; Paper presented at the Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association (93rd, Los Angeles, CA, August 23-27, 1985).
PUB TYPE Reports - Research/Technical (143) -- Speeches/Conference Papers (150)

EDRS PRICE MF01/PC02 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS Adults; *Affective Behavior; *Attribution Theory; Children; Congruence (Psychology); Emotional Development; *Emotional Response; Locus of Control; Personality Development; *Psychological Patterns; Self Esteem; *Social Psychology
IDENTIFIERS *Emotions

ABSTRACT

The psychology of emotion has been studied primarily from an intrapsychic perspective. A social psychological perspective of emotion can supplement this intrapsychic approach by examining three areas: (1) controlling the emotions of others; (2) controlling the thoughts of others through emotional expression; and (3) emotional congruence, or the fit between anticipated emotional communications and actual communications. To control the emotions of others, one must have naive theories about the determinants of emotion. Research has shown that attributional principles form the heart of some naive conceptions of emotion. Two attribution-based naive theories of emotion play important roles in the social lives of children and adults: self-esteem of others is controlled by altering communications along a locus dimension and anger of others is manipulated by altering communications along a controllability dimension. Other studies on how one's emotional expressions can control others' thoughts and feeling suggest that emotions function as cues that others can use. The emotional cues influence a variety of thoughts, including self-attribution, and communicated emotions play an important role in self-esteem and in attitude formation and change. Still other studies have examined emotional congruence. It is possible that the effects of incongruent emotional fits might enter into the dynamics of depression. These findings suggest that the social psychological perspective can supplement the intrapsychic approach to the psychology of emotions. (NRB)

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THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF EMOTIONS
WITH SOME CLASSROOM APPLICATIONS

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August 15, 1985

CG 018669

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Paper presented at the Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association, 93rd, Los Angeles, CA, August 23-27, 1985.

Abstract

It is contended that the psychology of emotions has been studied primarily from an intrapsychic perspective, thereby ignoring the social psychology of emotions. Three areas are examined from a social psychological perspective: controlling the emotions of others, influencing the thoughts of others by means of emotional communications, and the congruence or fit between anticipated emotions from others and what emotional expressions are received. Attribution theory and the naive laws of emotion provide the focus for the approach in this article.

The study of emotion in psychology quite typically is undertaken from the perspective a personality psychologist. The questions most frequently examined relate to the general emotion process (e.g., the necessity of arousal or facial involvement), the relation between thinking and feeling, the structure of emotions, or the identification of basic emotions and their evolutionary significance. Of course, the interpersonal context has not been completely ignored, for arousal cues have been suggested to be provided by the social context and some studied emotions such as jealousy and shame implicate another person as necessary for the experience. Nonetheless, it is legitimate to conclude that emotions primarily have been approached from an intrapsychic perspective. The present paper departs from this tradition and shifts the focus from the psychology of emotion to the social psychology of emotion. Hopefully, this will provide an important supplement to the intrapsychic approach that has dominated this field of study.

The social psychology of emotion, as discussed here, is divided into three areas: 1) controlling the emotions of others; 2) controlling the thoughts of others by means of emotional expression; and 3) the fit between anticipated emotional communications from others and actual communications. Of these, attention is most focused on the first topic of emotional control.

Controlling the Emotions of Others

To control the emotions of others, one must have naive theories about the determinants of emotion. For example, we often try to make children (or adults) "happy" by letting them win at a game. This intimates that persons hold a naive theory associating positive outcomes with the experience of happiness, and then manipulate the emotions of others by making sure

that they do attain their goal of victory. Of course, a naive theory need not be "true," but it is likely to be construed on the basis of some personal observations. Thus, the linkage between success and happiness is likely to be discarded if children cry after they win! Often naive theories also find counterparts in psychological theory. For example, the union of happy with success appears in the work of my colleagues and me (Weiner, Russell, & Lerman, 1978, 1979), for we postulate that happiness is an outcome-dependent affect, only marginally mediated by complex cognitive processes.

There are many other examples of naive theories (or mini-theories) about the determinants of emotion. Another illustration of a naive theory is when we say to others (or to ourselves): "You seem too anxious; you should cut down on your coffee drinking." This seems to be a naive utilization of an arousal concept, with the belief that general arousal augments a rather nonspecific (albeit negative) affective state. The mirror image of this theory is when we try to calm the distraught by giving them an alcoholic drink. Here the naive belief is that alcohol inhibits emotionality. We also might often hear something like the following: "You seem depressed; you should (forget about your ex-spouse; buy something you like; go to the movies"). In this example, there seems to be a general distraction principle being applied, or perhaps a behavioristic orientation, intimating that affect will be more positive if attention or behavior can be shifted from the negative to the positive. At times these naive theories take the form of aphorisms. One such example is the following: "Time heals all wounds." This adage conveys that the impact of an emotion decreases as a function of the time since the emotional event. Ruth Benedict (1934) documented how this naive principle is made use of by Zuni chiefs to control the emotions of the members of their tribe.

In a Zuni mourning ritual, on th fourth day after death, the bereaved are told by the chief that it has now been four years since the death of their kin:

> "The chief speaks to the people, telling them that they shall not remember any more, 'It is now four years he is dead,' ... time has lapsed to free them of their grief. The people are dismissed and the mourning is over." (Benedict, 1934, p. 101)

Now one might doubt that the people truly believe the chief, but at least they understand the emotional principle and perhaps even its utility.

One goal for emotion theorists might be to clarify and systematize these naive rules and document their usage in everyday life. Inasmuch as attribution theory often is considered a naive approach to psychology, it could provide a good foundation to organize naive theories of emotion and point out their interrelationships. In the research to be examined next, it will be seen that attributional principles form the heart of some naive conceptions of emotion.

The Control of the Self-Esteem of Others

It should come as little surprise to the reader that causal perceptions are related to self-esteem: success ascribed to internal factors augments self-esteem and evokes pride, while failure ascribed to personal factors lowers self-esteem. For example, we feel augmented self-esteem when ascribing an "A" in a course to ability and effort, rather than to an easy grading policy, and feel lower self-esteem when ascribing a low grade to ourselves rather than to a harsh grading system. The locus-esteem linkage is the basis for the so-called "hedonic bias," or the tendency to take more credit for positive than for negative outcomes. This bias, or error, has been fairly well-documented in the attribution literature and seems

to be due to motivational (ego-enhancement and/or ego-defensive) factors (see Weary-Bradley, 1978).

The actual association between locus and pride has been documented among childeren as young as six years of age. For example, Graham, Doubleday, and Guarino (1984) asked children ranging in age from 6 to 12 to recall an incident in which they experienced pride. The causes of the reported events were classified by the experimenter as internal, external, or intermediate (e.g., "We beat another basketball team that was really good; I tried hard but everyone else did too"). The classification of the causes of pride as a function of the age of the subjects, shown in Table 1, indicates a growing association between internal causality and feelings of pride. However, this relation is quite evident even among the 6-year-olds.

Insert Table 1 about here

Now let's consider how we manipulate the self-esteem of others by altering their causal thoughts. This issue was first examinied by Folkes (1982). She asked female college students to assume that they refused a dating request. The real reasons for the rejection were provided by the experimenter and either were internal to the requester (e.g., "His face and body type are not attractive") or were external to him (e.g., "You have the flu"). The causes also differed on other dimensions or properties of causality, but I will not be concerned with these differences here. The female participants were asked to reveal what cause they publicly would give to the requester. In addition, the participants also indicated the extent to which the public (communicated) and private (real) causes would "hurt the feelings" of the individual asking for a date, if those causes

were known to him. It was presumed that this phrase captures the general notion of personal esteem.

The relations between expectations of "hurt feelings" and three causal dimensions, or properties of causes, are shown in Figure 1. Figure 1 reveals that internal reasons for rejection are believed to most hurt the other's feelings.

Insert Figure 1 about here

Internal, stable, and uncontrollable causes (e.g., physically unattractive, unintelligent) maximize this belief. Furthermore, and of most interest in the present context, when the cause of rejection was external to the requester, the participants reported that they would communicate that reason 99% of the time. But when the real cause of rejection was internal to the requester, the female subjects indicated that they would lie almost 66% of the time. Hence, the behavior of the rejecting females might be considered benevolent, guided by an attempt to protect the self-esteem of others (although this is manifestly not the only interpretation of their behavior). Regardless of the reason for their action, the females did control the feelings of others by not saying "you are unattractive;" rather, they lied and communicated: "I already have an engagement for tonight." Note that such control is possible if and only if the subjects have a naive theory linking locus to self-esteem. <u>There would be no reason to lie, nor a program of how to lie, unless one had a theory of emotion</u>.

A colleague and I (Weiner & Handel, 1985) then examined whether this naive theory also is present among younger children (inasmuch as they do experience pride given internal ascriptions for success). We also explored

whether they use this knowledge to control the emotions of others. Within a role-playing paradigm, children ages 5-12 were presented with scenarios that involved social rejection. They were to pretend that they had rejected the request of a classmate to "go out and play." The reasons for rejection either were internal to the requester (e.g., "Your classmate is not very good at games") or were external to him or her (e.g., "You are sick with a bad cold"). After listening to each story, the children were asked questions assessing the likelihood of revealing the true reason for rejection and the magnitude of hurt feelings that would be experienced by the classmate if the cause was revealed.

Figure 2 shows the likelihood of communicating the cause as a function of its locus for the different age groups. It is apparent from Figure 2 that there is no developmental trend -- even the youngest children were less likely to reveal internal than external causes. And other data clearly confirmed that they also understand that the internal causes, if revealed, would "hurt the feelings" of the other. In sum, even young children have and use naive theories about the relation between attributions and feelings. That is, just like the rest of us, the six-year-olds are manipulators or controllers of emotions. That should not be of any comfort, or perhaps come as any surprise, to parents!

Insert Figure 2 about here

Controlling the Anger of Others

Causal perceptions also have been found to influence a number of other prevalent emotions, including anger and sympathy. Consider the following analysis of anger proposed by Averill (1983). Averill asked his respondents

to describe anger-arousing situations. He concluded:

> "The major issue for the person in the street is not the specific nature of the instigating event; it is the perceived justification for the instigator's behavior ... Over 85% of the episodes described by angry persons involved either an act that they considered voluntary and unjustified ... or else a potentially avoidable accident ... More than anything else, anger is an attribution of blame" (Averyill, 1983, p. 1150).

My colleagues and I have reported similar findings (e.g., Weiner, et al., 1978, 1979; Weiner, Graham, & Chandler, 1982). In the latter study, participants were also asked to describe times in their lives when they experienced anger. Most anger-arousing situations involved controllable actions, such as a roommate not cleaning the apartment when he or she was supposed to, or a friend lying.

On the other hand, sympathy is felt when others are in need of aid or are in a negative condition due to an uncontrollable cause (Graham et al., 1984; Weiner et al., 1982). Another's loss of a loved one because of an accident or difficulties because of a physical handicap are prototypical situations that evoke sympathy. Hence, the perceived controllability of a negative outcome (rather than the perceived causal locus) in part determines whether anger or sympathy is directed toward another. We feel angry toward the lazy, and therefore punish lack of effort, but sympathy toward the unable, and therefore do not punish lack of ability (Weiner & Kukla, 1970).

Do adults and children naively understand the controllability-anger union and alter the anger of others by manipulating their perceptions of

causality? This cause-anticipated affect-communication sequence seems most evident in an area that might best be labeled "excuse giving," or the providing of accounts (see Schlenker, 1980). Often individuals break social contracts by, for example, not appearing for a social engagement or arriving late. This behavior typically elicits attributional search; the "wronged" person asks: "Why did you fail to show up?" or "Why are you so late?" In addition, that person may display anger or aggravation. After all, none of us likes to be stood up or kept waiting. The issue raised here is, what does the individual do to mitigate this anger?

To explore this question, my colleagues and I (Weiner, Armikhan, Folkes, & Wachtel, 1985) asked college students to recall recent occasions in which social contracts were broken and to provide the true and false reasons that were communicated, as well as any uncommunicated (withheld) reasons. The participants also were asked how angry the recipient of the communication would feel, both given the real reason as well as the false communication (if in fact a lie was told).

Table 2 describes the type of reason that was given when a social contract was not fulfilled. Table 2 includes situations when the true reason was communicated as well as situations in which a false reason was given. It is evident from Table 2 that there were six basic categories of reasons. The majority of communicated explanations related to transportation problems ("My car broke down"), work/school requirements ("I had to study"), other commitments ("My friend needed a ride to the airport"), and physical ailments ("I came down with the flu.").

Insert Table 2 about here

Turning next from the communicated reasons to those that were withheld, Table 2 reveals that surpressed reasons predominantly involve a preference (desire) not to engage in the contracted activity (53%) or negligence (28%). These categories of explanation were withheld significantly more than they were offered as true or false reasons.

The causes were next rated (with a high degree of reliability) according to their placement on four causal dimensions or properties, labeled locus, stability, controllability, and intentionality. The control-intent distinction is illustrated in the differentiation between murder and manslaughter -- only the former implies foresight and premeditation. It is evident from Table 3 that withheld reasons primarily are internal, controllable, and intentional ("I did not want to go"). Internal, controllable, and unintentional causes ("I forgot") are the only other category of withheld reasons, although they often are truly (but not falsely) communicated. Conversely, true and false communicated reasons tend to be external, uncontrollable, and unintentional ("My car broke down"). Most of the explanations also involve unstable causes, so that stability was not a discriminating dimension of causality.

Insert Table 3 about here

Not all of the communicated explanations were believed. It was revealed that 28 or the 232 explanations offerd, or 12%, were perceived by the communicator to be disbelieved by the recipient of the communication. Thirteen of these explanations were in fact true, while 15 were false. Thus, from the perspective of the communicator, the recipients of excuses appear to be poor lie detectors. This is consistent with other research in the

field of lie detection. Of the 28 perceived lies, 15 were external, uncontrollable, and unintentional ("My car broke down"), almost equally divided between the true and false reasons.

Table 4 moves from an analysis of the explanations given or withheld to the consequences (or perceived consequences) of the believed and the disbelieved true and false communications. It is evident from Table 4 that the recipient of the communication is rated higher on anger when assuming that the withheld explanantion was known, or that the communicated explanation was not believed. Thus, true reasons believed were significantly less likely to provoke anger than true reasons not believed, and false reasons believed were significantly less likely to provoke anger than false reasons not believed.

Insert Table 4 about here

In sum, the data tell a simple but meaningful story. There is a naive belief that anger is in part influenced by causal ascriptions concerning why a social contract has not been fulfilled. To ward off these consequences, individuals may withhold the truth (lie), substituting instead explanations that are anticipated to result in positive consequences. The causal configuration of these "good" excuses is external, unstable, uncontrollable, and unintentional. Individuals generally are effective in their aims, for the vast majority of false reasons are believed. When persons fail in their manipulation attempts, or are not believed in spite of telling the truth, then the results for them are unfortunate. It is therefore functional to have a clear understanding of cognition-emotion linkages and to know how to influence the thoughts, and therefore the

feelings, of others.

Developmental considerations. Do children also know how to prevent others from becoming angry? To pursue this question, in the investigation by Weiner and Handel (1985) that examined the manipulation of self-esteem, children additionally were presented scenarios involving a broken social contract. They were to pretend that they "did not show up at a friend's house to complete a project." The reasons for not appearing either were subject to volitional control (e.g., "You decided to stay home and watch TV") or they were not controllable (e.g., "Your bike got a flat tire on the way to your friend's house"). After listening to each story, the children were asked questions assessing the likelihood of revealing the true reason for the transgression and the magnitude of anger that would be experienced by the classmate if the real cause was revealed.

Figure 3 shows the likelihood of communicating the cause as a function of its controllability and the age of the respondents. It is apparent from Figure 3 that the developmental trend is minor and that the very youngest children are less likely to reveal controllable than uncontrollable causes. And other data in this investigation clearly confirmed that they also understand that controllable causes, if revealed, would provoke anger in the other person. In sum, even young children have and use naive theories about the relation between controllability and anger.

Insert Figure 3 about here

Summary

Two very prevalent attribution-based naive theories of emotion play important roles in social lives. Self-esteem of others is controlled by

altering communications along a locus dimension; anger of others is manipulated by altering communications along a controllability dimension. This is true for children as well as for adults. These naive theories protect others from psychological damage and protect the self from possible harm because of retaliation. Hence, it is very functional to have "naive" theories of emotion that overlap with the "true" theories of emotion.

Using Emotional Expression to Control the Thoughts and Feelings of Others

I now turn to another aspect of the social psychology of emotion: How we alter the thoughts of others by means of emotional communication. It is quite evident that through their tears and smiles young infants influence the thoughts, and surely the feelings, of their parents. But let's probe how adults impart information by means of more controllable emotional expressions. Consider the following example, which I hope we never encounter. A student performs well on an exam and the teacher is passing back the paper. When coming to this student, she exclaims: "What a surprise, Bill. You did quite well." And accompanying this statement are vocal, facial, and postural associates of surprise. What is Bill likely to think when witnessing this emotional expression? First, it is likely he will conclude that success was not anticipated, for surprise is elicited given the unexpected. This is another of the naive rules of emotion. Given that success was not anticipated, Bill is likely to infer that the teacher thinks he is unable. This inferred attribution, in turn, is a determinant of his personal attributions for success and the feelings that are evoked by this attribution. Similarly, the expressions of anger, pity, guilt, and so forth convey attributional messages.

The general interpersonal process being proposed is depicted in Figure 4.

Insert Figure 4 about here

Figure 4 shows that the teacher has a private opinion about the ability (or effort, character, etc.) of the student. This is reflected in emotional experiences such as surprise, anger, and pity. Assuming that these emotions are communicated and encoded, the student is then able to infer the teacher's private beliefs. This, in turn, influences his or her own attributions and then expectancies, affect, and action.

My colleagues and I have conducted a number of studies with both children and adults manipulating various emotional cues and asking: 1) can subjects infer what the emotional communicator is thinking; and 2) do they normally engage in this inferential reasoning and does it alter self-ascriptions. In an example of the former type of research (see Weiner et al., 1979; Weiner, Graham, Stern, & Lawason, 1982), subjects are given vignettes such as:

> "A student failed a test and the teacher became angry. Why did the teacher think that the student failed?"

The affects most examined have been pity and anger, for we think these are of particular importance in achievement-related contexts. However, other affective labels including guilt, surprise, and sadness also have been presented.

Figure 5 and Table 5 depict the results of two studies, respectively using adults and children as subjects (Weiner, Graham, Stern, & Lawson, 1982). In the research with adults (see Figure 5), subjects were told that a teacher felt either anger, pity, or guilt when a pupil failed. The four cases rated were lack of effort, the teacher made the test too hard, low ability,

and bad luck. It is quite clear from Figure 5 that when failure elicits anger, then it is inferred that the teacher ascribes the failure to low effort. That is , anger conveys that the outcome was controllable, as was also suggested in the prior section of this paper. On the other hand, given pity as the communicated emotion, lack of ability is the inferred cause. And if guilt is expressed, then the teacher is assumed to have accepted responsibility for the failure. Table 5 shows that the association between anger and lack of effort is inferred by children as young as five years of age, while pity-ability union first emerges around the age of seven. Some psychologists have contended that children do not distinguish ability from effort until age nine or later. But this cannot be the case, for they do know the distinct emotional companions of these causes of success and failure.

Insert Figure 5 and Table 5 about here

Figure 5 and Table 5 depict results from the role-playing studies and demonstrate that emotional cues can be used. But do such inferences occur under more real-life circumstances, and does emotional communication influence self-attribution? Graham (1984) provided positive answers to these questions. In an experimental setting, she had "teachers" communicate anger or pity toward children who were failing a block-design task. In the anger condition the experimenter said following failure: "I'm really mad at you." This verbal feedback was loudly expressed with hands extended. In the pity condition the communication was : "I feel sorry for you." This was stated quietly with hands folded. The children subsequently were asked why the "teachers" thought they had failed, and what did they personally

perceive as the reason for their failure.

The data revealed that children receiving sympathy from the teacher inferred that they were perceived as failing because of a lack of ability; those receiving anger feedback inferred lack of effort as the perceived cause of failure; and there was no dominant causal inference when affective feedback was not delivered (control condition). These data are shown in Figure 6. The feedback also influenced self-ascriptions for failure, which were highest to low ability in the sympathy condition and greatest to lack of effort in the anger condition.

Insert Figure 6 about here

In sum, emotions function as cues that others can use because they possess naive rules relating emotions to particular thoughts. The emotional cues thus influence a variety of thoughts, including self-attributions. Communicated emotions therefore play an important role in self-esteem and in the broader topics of attitude formation and change, which are of fundamental importance in social psychology

Emotional Congruence

I now want to very briefly examine still another aspect of the social psychology of emotions, one that has received very scant attention: the fit or correspondence between an emotional expression from others and the emotion that one thinks is "deserved." Imagine, for example, a situation in which an individual fails at school or at a job because of a perceived lack of aptitude. This individual might experience shame, embarrassment, and humiliation, for these are the affective reactions given failure due to an internal, uncontrollable cause (see Brown & Weiner, 1984; Jagacinski &

Nicholls, 1984). He or she also might then anticipate pity, sympathy and concern from others, for these are reactions of others when failure or need is because of an uncontrollable factor (see Weiner, Graham, & Chandler, 1982). But assume that the observer ascribes the poor outcome to lack of effort and expresses anger, inasmuch as effort is under volitional control. In this case, there is a discrepancy between the affects anticipated by the failing student and the emotional message that is received. This discrepancy could possibly have its own emotional consequences, perhaps eliciting anger or dispair because one is not "understood."

A similar portrayal has been suggested by Coates and Wortman (1980) in their observations of reactions to depressives. Coates and Wortman documented that persons interacting with depressives often experience anger, thereby implying that the depressed person should be able to control (change) his or her behavior. But at times depressed individuals believe that their affective states are not subject to volitional control and that sympathy and concern are "deserved." The effects of such incongruent emotional fits might actually enter into the dynamics of depression, although this is mere speculation. On the other hand, the depressed person might also believe that sadness is controllable, in which case the communicated anger is another cue substantiating this belief, resulting in still further guilt since the "failure" is controllable. Here again the communicated affect is part of the dynamics of depression.

Concluding Comment

The relative neglect of, for example, the influence of emotional communication in the study of depression, is in part due to the intrapsychic focus when studying emotions. The intrapsychic approach has served as the foil for the present article. I do not want to argue that a person-oriented approach to emotions is not useful and valuable. It is, and much of my research also has been undertaken from that perspective. However, there is much richness and a great deal to be gained by studying affects from a social psychological perspective. As discussed here, this perspective leaned heavily on attribution theory and naive emotional rules. Of course, this is only one possible avenue of approach. The main message of this article is not to champion naive psychology, or attributional thinking, but rather that we have to supplement the intrapsychic approach that has dominated this field of study.

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Footnote

This paper is based on an invited address given at the American Psychological Association Convention, Los Angeles, August, 1985, sponsored by Divisions 8 and 15. The manuscript was written while the author was supported by Grant MH38014 from the Public Health Service, National Institute of Health.

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Table 1

Percentage of pride causes classified as internal, intermediate, and external, as a function of age (data from Graham, Doubleday, & Guarino, 1984)

Locus	Age		
	6	9	11
Internal	48%	76	82
Intermediate	26	11	16
External	26	13	2

Table 2

Categories of Explanation and Percentage Frequencies

as a function of Type of Reason

(from Weiner et al., 1985)

Category of Explanation	Type of Reason[1]		
	True (Communicated)	False (Communicated)	Withheld
Transportation	24%	15	2
Work/School	14	25	4
Prior Commitment	13	22	4
Physical Ailment	12	16	4
Negligence	17	6	28
Preference	9	1	53
Miscellaneous	10	15	4

[1] N = 116 within each type

Table 3

Percentage Frequency of Attributional Classification

as a function of Type of Reason

(from Weiner et al., 1985)

Attributional Classification	Type of Reason[1]		
	True (Communicated)	False (Communicated)	Withheld
Internal	48%	32	92
Controllable	35	10	90
Unstable	100	98	92
Intentional	12	6	75
Inter-Con-Inten	10	4	66
Inter-Con-Uninten	23	4	15
Exter-Uncon-Uninten	47	65	3

[1] N = 116 within each type

Table 4

Perceived Emotional Consequence of Excuse Related to the Excuse Classification (from Weiner et al., 1985)

Type of Reason	Anger Reaction[1]
True Believed	2.03
False Believed	2.26
Withheld	4.39
True, Not Believed	3.69
False, Not Believed	4.26

[1] High numbers indicate high anger

Table 5

Percentage choice of effort given the anger cue and ability given the pity cue, as a function of age

(from Weiner, Graham, Stern, & Lawson, 1982, p. 283)

Linkage	Age 9	Age 7	Age 5
Anger-effort	100%	89	77
Pity-ability	72	62	50

Figure Captions

Fig. 1. The actor's estimate of the requester's degree of hurt feelings as a function of the dimensional classification of the cause. (From Folkes, 1982, p. 245).

Fig. 2. Likelihood of revealing the cause as a function of its locus (Data from Weiner & Handel, 1985).

Fig. 3. Likelihood of revealing the cause as a function of its controllability (Data from Weiner & Handel, 1985).

Fig. 4. Sequence depicting the influence of communicated emotions on self-attribution.

Fig. 5. Attributional inferences as a function of the communicated affect (Data from Weiner, Graham, Stern, & Lawson, 1982).

Fig. 6. Inferred attributions for failure as a function of the affective communication (from Graham, 1984, p. 45).


Not hurt
10
8
6
4
2
Very hurt
DEGREE OF HURT
Ext - Uncontrollable
Ext-Controllable
Int-Controllable
Int-Uncontrollable
Unstable
Stable


LIKELIHOOD OF REVEALING
5
4
3
2
0
External
Internal
5-7
8-9
10-12
AGE GROUP


Uncontrollable
Controllable
LIKELIHOOD OF REVEALING
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
5-7
8-9
10-12
AGE GROUP


Private Evaluation of Target Person's Ability
Emotional Experience
Emotional Expression
Inferred Opinion of Other Regarding Own Ability
Self Perception of Own Ability
Expectations, Emotions, Performance


MEAN CAUSAL RATINGS
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Effort
Teacher/Task
Ability
Luck
Anger
Pity
Guilt
ABILITY


EFFORT
ABILITY
6
5
4
1
MEAN CAUSAL RATING
SYMPATHY
ANGER
CONTROL
AFFECT CONDITION